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The paper analyses the potential for lending booms in the three biggest new EU Member 
States (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) during the process of euro adoption. 
Experiences of some old members (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and the econometric 
evidence speak in favour of strong loan increases in Hungary and Poland even though 
their magnitude may be smaller than in the case of those recently recorded in Ireland and 
Portugal. Due to estimation problems, the situation in the Czech Republic was more 
difficult to foresee, but given almost complete interest rate convergence with the euro area 
only modest increases in lending should be expected there. In conclusion, it may be stated 
that, given the currently available information, no substantial risk to the banking sectors of 
the new Member States should be expected.  
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Non-technical summary 
During the process of euro adoption some participating Member States were faced with 
unprecedented lending booms. Loans to the private sector expanded at annual rates 
exceeding 20-30% in real terms. Mostly affected were the lower-income, catching-up 
countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland. This suggests that a similar process may 
be underway in the new EU Member States. These countries have relatively low GDP per 
capita levels and underdeveloped loan markets. This creates a huge growth potential, 
which, if triggered by interest rate convergence to the euro area level, could end up in a 
lending boom. Lending booms can be considered as a potential danger for the banking 
sectors. International evidence shows that periods of rapid credit growth have often been 
associated with banking crises. However, not every period of strong loan creation has to 
be harmful for the banking sector.  
 
In this paper we will try to answer the following questions:  
•  What size of lending booms can be expected in the new Member States? 
•  How big is the risk to their banking sectors? 
•  What are the policy implications? 
 
Hence, we restrict our attention to the loan developments and the banking sector condition 
and do not attempt to analyse the vast implications of interest rate declines and increased 
lending for macroeconomic stability (current account deficits, demand and inflation 
pressure, loss of competitiveness).  
 
In the first step we analysed the situation in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. We found that 
the booms started generally 3-4 years before euro adoption and peaked in the accession 
year. Despite the strong increase of loans, no adverse consequences were noted in the 
banking sectors. Banks remained profitable and well capitalised, non-performing loan 
ratios decreased. Accordingly, we can see that the strong increases in lending that these 
countries faced during euro area accession have been harmless to their banking systems. 
This may have two reasons. First, with the process of interest rate declines, loan servicing 
costs decline as well. This allows agents borrow more without increasing the repayment 
burden. However, since the loan expansion outpaced interest rate declines, which led to an 
increase in servicing costs, an additional explanation must be found. This can be the low 
initial loan servicing to GDP ratio, related to the low lending intermediation in these 
economies. As a result, even the strong lending booms increased the repayment burden 
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only to a level (relative to income) that has been previously serviced without major 
problems in more advanced euro area countries. 
 
As a second step we used econometric evidence to foresee the loan developments in the 
three biggest Central-European countries during euro area accession – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. On the basis of estimated vector error correction models 
we constructed simulated patterns for loan developments in the new Member States. We 
found that significant increases in lending can be expected in Hungary and Poland. 
However, their magnitude should be substantially smaller than experienced previously by 
Ireland and Portugal. The main reasons are the substantial level of interest rate 
convergence between Hungary, Poland and the euro area and the already very low level of 
interest rates in the euro area. Accordingly, there is not much room for downward interest 
rate adjustment during the years of these countries’ euro area accession. Due to estimation 
problems the situation in the Czech Republic was more difficult to assess. However, given 
almost complete interest rate convergence between the Czech Republic and the euro area, 
we expect increases in lending related to euro area accession to be even smaller than in 
Hungary and Poland.  
 
Finally, we used the above evidence to assess, how much risk for the banking sectors in 
the new Member States is associated with the euro area accession process. The experience 
of the analysed euro area countries, combined with the fact that Central-European 
countries show an even bigger initial underdevelopment of lending activities, have healthy 
banking sectors and can expect smaller loan increases, brought us to the conclusion that, 
with the currently available information, no substantial threat for their banking sectors can 
be seen.  
 
However, taking into account the relatively short data series, the long-time span covered, 
the fact that we concentrated on domestic currency loans only and the well-known 
difficulty in forecasting banking sector crises one should treat these results with 
appropriate caution. Thus, supervisory agencies should remain vigilant, and have at their 
disposal measures that could be applied in the case of danger. These include, for instance, 
changes in regulatory minima, provisioning rules or loan-to-value ratios and - in the most 
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1 Introduction 
During the process of euro adoption some participating Member States were faced with 
unprecedented lending booms
1. Loans to the private sector expanded at rates exceeding 
20-30% in real terms. Mostly affected were the lower-income, catching-up countries, 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland (further referred to as EMU-3). The sharp decline in interest 
rates, improving growth prospects and liberalisation of financial markets can be 
enumerated as main reasons for these developments. 
 
The stylised facts about lending booms in Greece, Portugal and Ireland suggest that a 
similar scenario may be underway in the new EU Member States. These countries aim at 
joining the euro area in a few years, they are poor relative to the rest of the euro area and 
face currently higher nominal and real interest rates. Since lending booms have often 
preceded banking sector crises it seems to be of utmost importance to policymakers in 
Member States to know in advance what they can expect in the near future, allowing them 
to take pre-emptive measures.  
 
In this paper we attempt to foresee developments on the loan markets of the new Member 
States during the process of euro area accession. The analysis is focused on the three 
biggest new EU Member States: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (further 
referred to as CE-3). They add up to about 80% of the eight Central-European acceding 
countries’ GDP and hence, should be paid particular attention. Being probably equally 
destructive for the home economy, a banking crisis in any of them would have more 
severe consequences for the stability and reputation of the euro area than one occurring in 
any of the smaller new Member States
2. In the analysis we concentrate only on the 
consequences of monetary integration, leaving out the problem of financial liberalisation 
and financial development (i.e. better access to credit markets, increased domestic and 
foreign competition etc.). The first is because banking sector regulations have been 
adjusted gradually since the early 1990s and currently do not diverge from EU standards. 
                                                      
1 Several definitions of lending booms can be found in the literature (e.g. Terrones, Mendoza (2004), 
Gourinchas et al. (2001)). We do not attempt to define this term precisely, but use it to describe growth rates 
(in real terms) of loans to the private sector of unprecedented magnitude (in the analysed sample).  
2 However, given the level of financial integration between Central European countries and the older Member 
States, even a collapse of a major bank would be very unlikely to seriously affect financial institutions from 
current euro area Member States. For an analysis of links between current core and peripheral euro area 
countries’ banks see Hartmann et al (2004).  
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Hence, in this respect there is not much to be expected as a consequence of the process of 
euro area accession. Financial development, on the other hand, will obviously proceed in 
the course of integration. This, however, deserves a separate study. 
 
This paper draws from the literature on lending booms and their possible consequences for 
banking sector stability and from the literature dealing explicitly with possible loan 
developments in the new EU Member States. 
 
The first topic has been covered broadly, although without leading to a generally accepted 
conclusion. On the one hand, several empirical studies have pointed at the strong 
relationship between credit growth and banking sector/ balance of payments crises
3. For 
instance,  Honohan (1997) reviews cases of financial crises in 24 developed and emerging 
markets and considers policy regime changes as an important source of banking crises. He 
also includes credit growth into his set of early warning indicators. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) after analysing banking sector crises in 29 countries conclude that 
credit growth (lagged two years) is highly significant for explaining a crisis. Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) review 27 empirical studies and note that most of them 
mention credit growth as one of the indicators of an upcoming banking sector/ balance of 
payments crisis. Similarly, Ball and Pain (2000), who review the literature on banking 
crises, conclude that domestic credit growth is consistently found as a significant indicator 
of an upcoming crisis. Terrones and Mendoza (2004) analyse credit booms in emerging 
market economies during the period from 1970 to 2002 and come to the conclusion that 
75% of the credit booms were associated with a banking crisis, while 85% were associated 
with a currency crisis.  
 
Other authors have argued that the relationship between loan expansions and crises is not 
as strong as suggested by the previous studies. Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerrechte 
(2001) analyse a broad sample of lending boom episodes over a 40-year sample. They find 
that the link between lending booms and banking crises is significant only in the Latin 
                                                      
3 In most cases the literature deals with banking and currency crises simultaneously. While a currency crisis in 
a Member State of the monetary union is obviously unlikely, there is no reason why there should not emerge a 
local banking crisis. Texas in the 1980s can serve as an example. Imprudent lending to the soaring oil industry 
and to the real estate field, followed by a strong decline of oil prices, resulted in a dramatic increase in non-
performing assets of the banking sector. Between 1987 and 1990 seven out of ten largest Texan banks failed 
and had to be bailed out by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Crum (2002)). 
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American subsample. Once these countries are removed from the data set, the relationship 
disappears. Hernandez and Landerrechte (2002) after analysing 25 developed and 35 
developing countries come to the conclusion that although lending booms are often 
followed by banking crises, this phenomenon is in most cases related to poor regulatory 
and supervising activities. Tornell and Westermann (2002) analyse banking crises in 39 
middle-income countries and find that the probability of a banking crisis conditional on a 
lending boom is only between 5.7% and 8.9%. 
 
On the other hand, the topic of potential lending booms and related macroeconomic 
imbalances (eg. current account deficits) resulting from euro area accession of the new EU 
Member States, has not received much attention yet.  
 
Cottarelli et al. (2003) present a broad analysis of the Central European and Balkan 
countries’ banking sectors. They also attempt to model the possible developments in loans 
to the private sectors of these countries in the near future. For this purpose, the authors use 
an international panel of non-transition developing and industrialised countries, relating 
the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP to a set of variables including the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, GDP per capita, inflation and indices of financial liberalisation. Having 
compared the actual and theoretical values of credit to GDP in Central European countries 
the authors conclude that their loan markets are still substantially undersized. The 
deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from equilibrium has been estimated at 27 percentage 
points in the Czech Republic, 41 p.p. in Hungary and 42 p.p. in Poland. The authors 
conclude that fast credit growth should be expected in Central European countries in the 
near future, without, however, pointing explicitly at euro area accession as the main 
reason. 
 
A more explicit approach to the consequences of euro area accession has been adopted by 
Schadler at al. (2005). This paper analyses various aspects of the prospective euro 
adoption in Central Europe. The presented simulations suggest a very strong loan 
expansion during the process of euro adoption, with annual growth rates peaking at 30-
45% in real terms. However, these results are based on the assumption that just after euro 
adoption the new Member States will start converging to the equilibrium level of an error 
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In our view, however, there is no reason to expect that euro adoption will immediately 
trigger a process of financial deepening consistent with the experience of old euro area 
members. Central European countries showed for many years relative underdevelopment 
of their financial markets (probably being a legacy of the old system) and the process of 
catching up should be more related to financial liberalisation, EU entry and deeper market 
penetration by foreign banks, than to euro area accession as such. Hence, in this paper we 
adopt a different approach towards predicting the potential for lending booms and possible 
adverse banking sector developments in the new Member States
4.  
 
First, we analyse thoroughly the recent loan market history of relatively similar euro area 
countries, which witnessed strong loan expansions while adopting the common currency 
(Greece, Portugal and Ireland) together with policy measures adopted by their 
monetary/supervisory authorities. We postulate that the relative similarity of these 
countries before euro area accession and CE-3 countries today increases the likelihood of 
similar loan market developments in Central Europe. Second, we estimate simple models 
of the loan markets in the CE-3 countries and, given exogenous assumptions about euro 
area accession, predict lending behaviour during the upcoming process of monetary 
integration. 
 
It must be mentioned that both approaches have their drawbacks. Drawing conclusions 
from past experience is warranted if no substantial changes to policy are expected in the 
future. However, joining a monetary union is a substantial policy change, and thus 
extrapolating past relationships into the future should be treated with much caution. On 
the other hand, drawing conclusions from the experience of other countries, that joined the 
common currency area earlier, can be risky as well. It cannot be taken for granted that 
even given some similarities, loan market developments in the old and new Member 
States will be alike. Nevertheless, at this point of time we do not see any better way to 
predict lending patterns in new Member States during euro area accession. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 stylised facts about the old and 
new Member States, their loan markets and banking sectors are given. In Section 3 we use 
econometric evidence to simulate developments in lending in the new Member States 
during euro area accession. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                      
4 In this paper we do not attempt to analyse the vast implications of interest rate declines and increased lending 
for macroeconomic stability (current account deficits, demand and inflation pressure, loss of competitiveness). 
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2  Stylised facts about selected euro area countries and new 
Member States 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, we present below a brief description of the lending 
developments
5 in Portugal, Ireland and Greece during the process of euro adoption. 
Further, we present some stylised facts about banking sectors and lending to the private 
sector in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Finally, we compare the situation of 
EMU-3 and CE-3 countries before euro area accession. 
2.1  Euro area countries 
Portugal 
Portugal adopted the euro in 1999 and can be regarded as the model example of a euro 
area accession driven lending boom. The expansion started around 1995-96 and reached 
its maximum in Q3 1999 at 28.6% (in real terms
6), then returned within two years time to 
the 0-5% range (Fig. 1). It was accompanied by a relatively gradual reduction in real 
interest rates. The real short-term rate fell from 7.2% in Q1 1995 to zero in Q1 1999 and 
remained around this value for the next few years. The expansion started in housing loans 
and was strongest in this area (the real growth rate peaked at 33.9%). Moreover, it should 
be taken into account that the expansion of mortgages is underestimated due to a large 
volume of securitisation transactions
7. Most new loans were, however, created for the 
corporate sector (EUR 59 bn) with housing loans closely behind (EUR 56 bn). 
 
No substantial deterioration of the banking sector could be noted (Tab. 1). Banks 
remained sufficiently capitalised as reflected by a relatively stable solvency ratio of 9.2-
12.4%. From 1999 on, non-performing loans accounted for slightly more than 2% of total 
loans. This indicator should, however, be treated with caution, since it tends to brighten 
the situation during loan expansions and show the problem only with a substantial lag
8. 
                                                      
5 Unless stated otherwise the terms loans or lending will mean loans to the private sector (households + non-
financial corporations + non-profit institutions serving households) throughout the paper. 
6 Interest rates and loans have been deflated using the current GDP deflator. 
7 According to the estimates of the Banco de Portugal (BdP (2003)), the growth rate of housing loans adjusted 
for securitisation was 11.7% in 2003 as compared to the balance sheet rate of 2.2%. 
8 The obvious reason is that new loans granted are “good loans” for some time. Thus, in periods of fast credit 
growth, the denominator of the non-performing loan ratio increases quickly, while the numerator shows a 
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Profitability of the sector, as measured by return on assets (ROA), was stable, although 
not particularly high, only slightly above the euro area average. The prolonged expansion 
led to a significant increase in the loan-to-GDP ratio, which amounted to 136% in 2003, 
one of the highest in the euro area. It is noteworthy that the lending boom did not lead to 
significant asset price increases. In particular, despite high growth rates of housing loans, 
the growth rate of real estate prices remained modest over the recent years (IMF 2003c). 
 











































Real total loans y-o-y Real 3-month interest rate
 
Source: Own calculations based on ECB and OECD data. 
 
Table 1: Selected indicators of performance of the Portuguese banking sector (%), (1995-
2003) 




ROA Loan- to-GDP 
ratio 
1995 11.8  5.9 0.6 63 
1996 11.4  5.2 0.6 67 
1997 11.5  4.0 0.7 76 
1998 12.4  2.9 0.8 90 
1999 10.8  2.2 0.9 109 
2000 9.2  2.2 0.9 128 
2001 9.5  2.1 0.9 132 
2002 9.8  2.3 0.7 135 
2003 10.0  2.4 0.8 136 
Source: IMF, Banco de Portugal and own calculations based on ECB and IMF data. 
                                                                                                                                                  
higher volume of bad loans only with a lag. Accordingly, during a boom the NPL ratio falls for some time and 
need not reflect the upcoming deterioration of the asset portfolio. 
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The lending boom in the Irish banking sector started around 1995, i.e. four years before 
euro area accession. Real total loans to the non-financial sector increased by 32.1% y-o-y 
at the peak in 1998 and by 31.9% at a second peak one year later. In these terms, Ireland 
witnessed the most spectacular loan expansion among the euro area countries. By 2002, 
the boom seemed to be over, however, in 2004 another period of strong loan expansion 
started. Regarding the sector decomposition, sources of loan creation were relatively 
balanced. In the first expansion phase corporate loans were the major source of expansion, 
whereas after 2002 this role was taken over by housing loans. Even a cursory look at the 
data (Fig. 2) reveals that the drop of real interest rates, which started in 1993, could have 
been a major reason behind the expansion. The real 3-month interest rate dropped from 
above 10% in 1993 to negative regions in 1998 and remained there with minor exceptions 
until 2004. In this respect it should be noted that the ERM crisis and the subsequent drop 
in interest rates from very high levels could have influenced the magnitude and the time of 
occurrence of the lending boom in Ireland.  
 
The loan expansion did not undermine the strength of the Irish banking sector. The capital 
adequacy ratio remained broadly stable over the analysed period and stayed securely 
above the minimum requirement of 8% (Tab. 2). Banking sector profitability, as measured 
by ROA, decreased slightly from 1.7% in 1995 to 1.3% in 2003. This process reflected 
falling interest margins, related to historically low interest rates and a shift away from 
deposits towards more expensive financing sources like loans from foreign banking 
institutions. Nevertheless, profitability remained much above the euro area average of 
0.7% in 2003. Finally, loan quality improved, the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans decreased from 2.8% in 1997 to 1.1% in 2003. Like before, it should be taken into 
account that this ratio is a lagged indicator of loan quality. Both, IMF missions (IMF 
(2001b), IMF (2003b)) and the Irish supervisory authorities seem to be satisfied with the 
performance of the banking sector, however, pointing at one source of concern. The surge 
of mortgage loans brought about a boom of house prices, which over the last six years 
were growing at an annual rate of almost 20% (CBI (2001), CBI (2002), CBFA (2004)). 
Although there is no clear evidence of overvaluation, there is some risk that Ireland faces 
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Real loans y-o-y Real 3-month interest rate
Source: Own calculations based on ECB, OECD and Reuters data. 
 
Table 2: Selected indicators of the performance of the Irish banking sector (%), (1995-
2003) 




ROA Loan to GDP ratio 
1995 13.0  NA 1.7 67 
1996 11.6  NA 1.8 71 
1997 11.1  2.8 1.4 89 
1998 11.0  2.5 1.7 92 
1999 10.4  1.8 1.6 111 
2000 9.7  1.9 1.5 117 
2001 11.2  1.9 1.5 123 
2002 12.5  1.7 1.5 117 
2003 11.0  1.1 1.3 127 
Source: IMF, Central Bank of Ireland and own calculations based on ECB and IMF data. 
 
Greece 
The case of Greece is not the most evident example of a euro-accession driven loan 
expansion. It is not obvious whether the lending boom, whose beginning can be observed 
around 1995, was related to monetary integration. No significant decrease in real rates 
could be observed before this event (Fig. 3); moreover, it seems that at that time nobody 
could be sure at what point in time Greece would enter the euro area. A more likely 
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explanation of the expansion is the removal of foreign exchange controls over 1993-94 
which brought about a surge in foreign exchange lending (Honohan (1999), IMF (2001a)). 
Obviously, the capital account liberalisation can be regarded as a step towards monetary 
union, but it is not  relevant for the examination of possible developments in the new 
Member States, since capital controls have already been liberalised there. Having this in 
mind, one should probably concentrate on the last phase of expansion, visible since 2000. 
This phase followed an obvious drop in real rates from 5-6% in 1999 to about 1% in 2000 
and further into negative regions in the following years. Loan expansion of over 20% in 
real terms followed soon, peaking at 22% in Q2 2001 and remaining above 10% until the 
end of the sample. Data disaggregation shows a clear winner of the Greek lending boom: 
loans for housing purposes with highest growth rates over the whole period. In real terms 
they exceeded 30% in 2001-02 (BoG (2003b)). On the other hand, corporate loans’ annual 
growth rate did not make it above 20%. Nevertheless, due to the higher initial level, 
corporate loans added most to the expansion (EUR 18 bn) followed by mortgages (EUR 
16.9 bn). 
 








































Real loans y-o-y Real 3-month interest rate
Source: Own calculations based on ECB and OECD data. 
 
As in the previous cases, the prolonged loan expansion did not adversely affect the Greek 
banking sector (Tab. 3). Solvency remained broadly stable at 10-13.6% as measured by 
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the capital adequacy ratio. The quality of the loan portfolio improved over time bringing 
the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio down to 8.1% in 2002 from over 19% in 1995. Only 
the profitability of the sector decreased substantially over the last four years, reflecting a 
general decrease in non-interest income due to weak equity markets performance (BoG 
(2000), BoG (2001), BoG (2002), BoG (2003a)). In general, no unwelcome developments 
were noticed, the only exception being a steady increase of property prices, of about 10% 
per annum for several years (IMF (2003a)), driven by mortgage lending. 
 
Table 3: Selected indicators of performance of the Greek banking sector (%), (1995-2003) 




ROA Loan to GDP ratio 
1995 12.8  19.5 NA 34 
1996 10.3  19.0 NA 36 
1997 10.3  16.5 0.7 37 
1998 10.2  13.6 0.7 40 
1999 16.2  15.5 2.4 43 
2000 13.6  12.3 1.4 49 
2001 12.5  9.2 1.0 57 
2002 10.5  8.1 0.5 61 
2003 11.9  NA 0.9 66 
Source: IMF, Bank of Greece and own calculations based on ECB and IMF data. 
 
Protective measures 
In order to assess to what extent the lack of adverse consequences of the lending booms in 
the old Member States was their intrinsic feature and to what extent a result of policy 
actions, a brief overview of protective measures taken by the EMU-3 supervising 
institutions is presented below. As it can be seen from Table 4, the actions were not 
drastic. Taking this into account one could risk the point that the observed lending booms 
had a rather harmless character, being probably related to the fact that the EMU-3 
countries had relatively underdeveloped loan markets and simply caught up with more 
mature EMU economies. In other words, the lending intermediation and the respective 
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Table 4: Protective measures taken by the supervising authorities of the EMU-3 countries 
during euro area accession 
Country Measure  applied 
Greece  • Tightening of provisioning rules for non performing loans and loans with 
limited collateral  
• Holdings of non-remunerated deposits from excessive credit growth 
imposed on commercial banks 
Ireland  • Letter of concern sent by the central bank to commercial banks 
• All credit institutions requested to arrange independent verification of 
their compliance with the best international standards of risk management 
and control 
• More intensified inspections of mortgage and commercial property 
lenders to examine the quality of underwriting 
• Establishment of single financial markets regulatory and supervising 
institution  
Portugal  • Increased capital requirements for housing loans with loan-to-value ratio 
exceeding 75%  
• Introduction of provisions based on average loan performance over the 
economic cycle  
• Establishment of national council of supervisors, involving all financial 
markets supervisory agencies  
Source: CBI (2002), BoG (2003), IMF (2000), IMF (2003a) 
 
Common features 
Several common features of loan expansions in the analysed countries can be found. 
These can be useful when drawing conclusions for the new Member States. 
 
•  Timing: Lending booms started 1-4 years before euro area accession and peaked in 
all countries in the accession year. Despite a significant slowdown in all the 
countries it is not sure whether the process has already fully died out. There is, 
however, no unique time pattern as regards the relative behaviour of corporate, 
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•  Driving force: Highest growth ratios were noted in lending for housing purposes. 
However, due to the initial low amount of outstanding mortgage loans, in all the 
countries most new loans were created for corporates. Nevertheless, the 
differences are only minor. 
 
•  Side effects: As a general rule no significant side effects for the banking sectors 
were  noted. The sectors remained profitable and well capitalised, non-performing 
loan ratios declined. One notable exception are real estate prices, which increased 
substantially in Greece and Ireland. However, there is no clear evidence of a price 
bubble in any of these countries. Although serious problems in the banking sector 
seem now unlikely, some trouble cannot be ruled out, since in the two countries 
the booms are not over yet. 
 
•  Financial deepening: Loan-to-GDP ratios increased substantially in all three 
countries, approximately 2 times between 1995 and 2003. However, while 
Portugal and Ireland overtook, in this respect, most euro area countries, Greece’s 
lending sector remained underdeveloped.  
 
•  Protective measures: Although all the EMU-3 countries’ supervising bodies 
undertook actions to diminish the scale or potential negative consequences of the 
booms, these cannot be regarded as drastic. Hence, it seems that, by their 
character, the booms reflected rather harmless financial deepening than 
unsustainable developments on the lending market. 
 
2.2  New Member States 
The banking sectors of the CE-3 countries underwent dramatic changes during the 
transition period. Until the 1980s, these countries did not have a two-tier banking sector. 
Their banking systems were dominated by the so-called monobank, which combined the 
functions of central and commercial banks. In the late 1980s, the CE-3 countries decided 
to create a two-tier banking system, separating several commercial institutions from the 
central bank. This process, however, carried, from the very beginning, a sort of “original 
sin”. The newly created banks were heavily burdened by bad loans inherited from the past. 
They also lacked the know-how of modern banking (including the inability to properly 
assess risk). Moreover, young and inexperienced supervisory institutions were not 
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prepared to enforce a restructuring process. As a result, in all CE-3 countries substantial 
aid from the public sector had to be given to rescue the banking systems
9. 
 
Poland and Hungary started the restructuring process relatively early. Around 1992-1994 
banks in both countries were recapitalised (Polański (2002), Varhegyi (2002)), in Hungary 
bad loans were also partially transferred to a specialised institution. Full restructuring 
costs are estimated to have been around 6% of GDP in Poland and 13% in Hungary 
(Szapary (2001)). Simultaneously, the privatisation process was started. As a result, the 
bulk of commercial banks have been sold to foreign financial institutions. In 2003 foreign 
ownership amounted to 68% of the banking system assets in Poland and to 83% in 
Hungary (ECB (2005)).  
 
The restructuring and privatisation processes in the Czech Republic were more 
troublesome than in Hungry and Poland. The restructuring process, which started in the 
early 1990s, was followed by the so-called voucher privatisation, which did not change 
the status quo in most big banks, where the state retained majority ownership. As a result, 
when the economy was hit by a currency crisis and a recession in 1997-98, many poorly 
managed banks faced severe problems. At the end of 1999 more than 40% of loans 
granted by the large banks were classified (Tuma (2002)). As a result, a huge restructuring 
program was introduced; its cost is estimated at 18% of GDP (Szapary (2001)). 
Subsequently, the big banks have been privatised, so that in 2003 foreign ownership in the 
Czech banking system’s assets amounted to 96%. However, the bad loan problem coupled 
with economic recession contributed to a substantial decrease of loans granted to the 
private sector in 1998-2001. This episode differentiates the Czech Republic from the other 
two countries. While in Hungary and Poland, over the last decade a steady increase of the 
loan-to-GDP ratio could be observed, the Czech Republic faced a strong contraction (Fig. 
4).  
 
Being a legacy of the previous economic system, the ratio of total loans to GDP in CE-3 
countries is relatively low compared to other euro area members, even controlling for 
differences in economic development (Schadler et al. (2005), Cottarelli et al (2003)).  
 
                                                      
9 We present only a rough overview of the restructuring processes of CE-3 countries’ banking sectors. For 
detailed information see Balassa (1995), Bonin et al. (1998), Polański (1995) and Wyczański (1993). 
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Figure 4: Total loans to the private sector as percent of GDP in the Czech Republic, 
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Source: Own calculations based on CNB, MNB, NBP and OECD data 
 
Looking at disaggregated data several observations can be made. First, foreign currency 
loans form a substantial, but not overwhelming, part of the banks’ portfolios. Over the last 
years, the share of foreign currency loans in total loans to the private sector ranged 
between 15-28% in the Czech Republic, and increased from 25-35% in Hungary and from 
14% to 25% in Poland (Fig. 5).  
 
Second, regarding sector decomposition, a common tendency can be observed – a steady 
increase in the share of loans to households and a decline of the corporate loan share. By 
2004, the share of households increased to almost 50% of total loans to the private sector 
in Poland, about 35% in the Czech Republic and more than 30% in Hungary. 
 
Third, very deep underdevelopment of the housing loan market can be observed. The ratio 
of housing loans to total loans to the private sector amounted in June 2004 to 9.3% in 
Poland and 17.1% in the Czech Republic; only in Hungary it attained 31.1%. With 
exception of the latter, these numbers seem low as compared to 34% in Ireland, 38% in 
Portugal and 36% for the Union as a whole. Thus, whatever results for total loan 
expansions will emerge from the latter analysis, it should be remembered that the growth 
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potential of selected categories might be much bigger than the average and that these areas 
should be paid special attention. Mortgage lending is a prominent example. 
 
Figure 5: Share of foreign currency loans in total loans to the private sector in the Czech 
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Source: Own calculations based on CNB, MNB and NBP data 
 
The current condition of the banking sectors in the CE-3 countries is good. Banks are well 
capitalised and their loan portfolios are not excessively troubled by non-performing assets 
(Tab. 5). In the latter case, Poland, with its high NPL ratio may look as an outlier, 
however, the numbers reflect the very strict classification and provisioning rules
10 that 
have been eased only recently (NBP (2004a)), and hence the ratio is expected to decrease 
substantially in the near future. With the exception of the Hungarian mortgage market 
(MNB (2004)) there are no lending booms which could possibly threaten to result in 
substantial increases of bad loans. The macroeconomic outlook for all three countries 
seems positive, GDP is expected to grow at 3.5-5% in the near future (EC (2004)) and 
inflation remains low. Moreover, as already mentioned, most of the region’s commercial 
                                                      
10 For instance, until December 2003 Polish banks had no motivation to write-off lost loans. If such loan had 
been repaid at a later date, it would have been treated as exceptional profit and become subject to heavy 
taxation (NBP 2003). 
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banks have now big foreign credit institutions as majority shareholders. Hence, it is highly 








Non-performing loans/total loans  4.5% 3.4%
  17.2% 
Capital adequacy ratio  13.6% 11.5%
  15.6% 
Source: National Central Banks.  
 
2.3  Comparing the old and new Member States 
If predictions about lending patterns in new Member States are to be made from the above 
experience, one should check whether the initial conditions are similar between the groups 
of countries. Table 6 presents a brief comparison of the economic and banking sector 
characteristics. Since, according to official declarations, it can be expected that the new 
members will join the euro area around 2009-2010, we compare their current situation 
with that of the old members five years before accession, i.e. 1994 for Ireland and 
Portugal and 1996 for Greece.  
 
The old members were slightly more developed as measured by GDP per capita 
(especially as compared with Poland), Ireland and Portugal had also a much higher level 
of lending intermediation. Nevertheless, on average, the differences here are not 
overwhelming. The divergence becomes more pronounced if one regards interest rates, 
which are expected to be the main driving factor behind lending booms. The new Member 
States are more advanced as regards nominal convergence with the euro area (inflation, 
interest rates). This is not only true for absolute levels, but also for spreads over German 
bonds and German/euro area short-term rates. The average real short-term rate in the CE-3 
countries stood at 3.1% in 2004 as compared to 4.2% in the EMU-3 countries in the mid 
1990’s. Spreads on long-term bonds are lower in CE-3 countries by 0.5 percentage point, 
while the spread on short-term rates is lower by 1.7 percentage points. Moreover, one has 
to remember that in the EMU-3 countries the convergence of spreads was accompanied by 
                                                      
11 However, experiences in this respect have been rather mixed so far. In 2003 the Belgian owner KBC 
recapitalised the Polish Kredyt Bank when there was a serious threat of falling below the 8% margin for 
capital adequacy. On the other hand, Bayerische Landesbank left the Croatian Rijecka Bank stranded in 2002, 
when it faced bankruptcy as a result of losses generated in the dealing room. 
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a substantial decline of German/ euro area interest rates. This need not happen at the time 
the CE-3 countries enter the euro area since interest rates are currently at historically low 
levels there, probably below their long-run equilibrium level. Thus, at the first sight it 
seems that the lending boom potential in the new Member States is smaller than in the old 
Member States. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the CE-3 countries are not 
homogenous as regards interest rate levels. For instance, real and nominal short rates are 
much higher in Poland and Hungary than in the Czech Republic.   
 


















GDP per capita at PPP $ (constant prices)  15131  19231  15093  17181 14345 16265 15342 11427 
Loans to private sector/GDP  35.6%  63.7%  59.0%  49.7% 36.0% 32.7% 44.9% 30.5% 
Nominal 3M interest rate  13.8%  5.9%  11.1%  9.8% 6.3% 2.1% 11.3%  5.5% 
Nominal 10Y interest rate  9.7%
a)  8.0% 10.5%  8.9% 6.3% 4.6% 7.8% 6.6% 
Inflation rate (HICP)  7.9%  2.9%  5.0%  5.4% 3.1% 1.3% 6.1% 1.8% 
Real 3M interest rate  5.5%  2.8%  5.8%  4.2% 3.1% 0.8% 4.9% 3.7% 
Real 10Y interest rate  4.1%  5.0%  5.3%  4.5% 3.2% 3.3% 1.7% 4.7% 
Spread to Germany/ euro area – short rate  10.5%  0.6%  5.8%  5.5% 4.2% 0.0% 9.2% 3.4% 
Spread to Germany – long rate  4.2%  1.2%  3.6%  2.7% 2.2% 0.5% 3.7% 2.5% 
Non-performing loans/total loans  19.0%  2.8%  7.0%  10.9% 8.4% 4.5% 3.0%
  17.2% 
Capital adequacy ratio  10.3%  13.0%  11.8%
b)  11.7% 13.6% 13.6% 11.5%
  15.6% 
Note: data on inflation and interest rates are 12-month averages. For CE-3 countries June 2004 data is presented, except 
GDP, where IMF estimates for 2004 are given. The averages are unweighted. 
a)  July – December 1997 data 
b)  1995 data 
Source: ECB, Eurostat, IMF, National Central Banks and Reuters.  
 
Inferring from the statistical information, the following can be said about potential lending 
booms in the new Member States.  
 
First, in principle they should be considered prone to substantial loan expansions. They 
have a big catching-up potential and still face relatively high interest rates, which means 
that there is room for real interest rate reductions. However, the room is substantially 
smaller than it was in the case of the EMU-3 countries.  
 
Second, if the pattern of EMU-3 countries were to be repeated, one could expect the 
process starting around 2006-2008 (provided that accession will find place in 2009-2010) 
and peaking in the year of accession. The EMU-3 experience does, however, not allow 
drawing firm conclusions about the end of the boom.  
 
Third, taking into account the relative underdevelopment of mortgage lending, this area of 
bank activity can be expected to grow fastest.  
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Fourth, the very low level of lending intermediation in the CE-3 countries leaves much 
space for a relatively safe financial deepening. 
 
Fifth, the condition of the CE-3 countries banking sectors is good. Given the experience of 
EMU-3 countries, provided that supervisory measures of similar power are applied and 
the booms do not exceed those experienced in these countries one is inclined to risk the 
hypothesis that substantial financial trouble should not be expected in the CE-3 
economies. 
 
3  The potential for lending booms in the new Member States 
3.1  Model and data 
In order to go beyond simple inference based on comparing statistics, we construct 
econometric models of loan developments. Although we want to forecast only the 
developments in the CE-3 economies, we build models for all six countries. This is done 
for two reasons. First, since the new Member States have undergone a deep transformation 
of their economic systems and their time series are not particularly long, models, 
especially based on quarterly data, are not always of top quality. Second, there is some 
risk that the accession to the euro area is by itself such a deep change in economic 
conditions that it could result in a breakdown of the econometric relationship describing 
the loan behaviour. Therefore, the relationships estimated for the EMU-3 countries could 
be used as a supportive tool for forecasting loan expansions in the CE-3 countries. 
Moreover, these models can be used to check whether the relationships remain stable upon 
euro area entry. 
 
For several reasons we try to keep the specification as simple as possible. First, the 
availability of time series for the new Member States is limited. A number of time series 
starts only very recently. Since we would like to have the same data set for all three new 
Member States, this limits substantially our possibilities. Second, even the longest 
available series are relatively short (not longer than 10 years of quarterly observations). 
Limiting the data set helps save the model’s degrees of freedom. Third, the model will be 
used for building a conditional forecast of loan developments. Every variable which were 
to enter into the model but were not sufficiently explained within it, would require 
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exogenous assumptions for the forecast horizon. This would unnecessarily increase the 
level of discretion. 
 
Having this in mind, we follow the approach adopted recently by Hofmann (2001), Calza, 
Gartner and Sousa (2001) and Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003) and build a vector error 
correction model in real loans to the private sector, real GDP and real interest rate
12. This 
is certainly not a complete list of loan determinants. However, since we still lack a widely 
accepted theory of loan evolution, we have decided to concentrate on variables, which are 
considered as basic determinants of money and loan creation i.e. output and interest rates 
(Laidler (1991), Borio and Lowe (2004)). Although one could think of additional 
determinants of loan development (e.g. indices of financial liberalisation, crowding-out, 
capital available to banks) it seems impossible to obtain a consistent cross-country data set 
on quarterly basis for these variables. It should be also borne in mind, that since the 
quantity of loans is determined simultaneously by supply- and demand-side factors, the 
relationship we estimate should not be treated as a demand or supply equation. The time 
series used for estimation purposes have been plotted in Appendix 3 (Fig. 13-18). 
 
The long-run relationship takes the following form: 
 
(1)  0 2 1 0 = − − − t t t r y l β β β  
 
where l stands for the log of real loans, y for the log of real GDP and r for the real rate of 
interest. Accordingly, the vector error correction model takes the form: 
 
(2)  t t t n t n t t c x x x x ε αβ + + + ∆ Γ + + ∆ Γ = ∆ − − − 1 1 1 ' ...  
 
where xt=[lt, yt, rt]’, ∆ denotes the first difference, Γ are matrices of short-run coefficients, 
α is the load matrix of error correction coefficients, β is the matrix of long-run 
coefficients and ε denotes the vector of residuals. 
 
                                                      
12 Since in the CE-3 countries a significant part of lending is done in foreign exchange, we also tested a 
specification including the real effective exchange rate for these countries. However, this resulted mainly in 
wrongly signed and unstable coefficients in the cointegrating vector. 
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We use quarterly data starting from Q1 1981 for Portugal, Q1 1983 for Greece and 
Ireland, Q1 1995 for the Czech Republic and Poland and Q4 1995 for Hungary, where the 
starting point is determined by data availability. All the series terminate in Q2 2004. Total 
domestic currency denominated loans to the private sector are taken for CE-3 countries
13, 
total loans to the private sector for the EMU-3 countries. Since no consistent data on loan 
interest rates was available, we used the 3-month money market rate. Interest rates and 
loans were deflated using the GDP deflator. Moreover, GDP at constant prices is used for 
all countries. A detailed description of data sources is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
According to the model specification real loans, GDP at constant prices and real interest 
rates should be integrated of order one. From the theoretical point of view, this is certainly 
not controversial as regards loans and GDP. However, as to real interest rates, it is not 
completely clear whether they should be treated as stationary or non-stationary variables 
(Lanne (2002)). However, since we are trying to model consequences of permanent shifts 
in real rates it seems more appropriate to include them in the cointegrating vector. The 
unit root tests (Tab. 7) tend to suggest that all the analysed variables are indeed integrated 
of order 1. 
 
3.2  Estimation and simulation  
We estimate a separate VEC model for each country. As a first step, we determine the 
number of lags in each model. We use three information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz and 
Hannan-Quinn) and the LR sequential test (Tab. 8). If these are conclusive (at least three 
criteria indicating the same lag), we choose the indicated number of lags, if not (or if they 
indicate 0 lags as in the case of Hungary), we build a small model with well-behaved 
residuals (Tab. 10 and 11). Inferring from the maximum eigenvalue and trace tests 
(Johansen (1991)), we find one cointegrating vector at the 5% level in the cases of 
Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Portugal (Tab. 9). The null of zero vectors cannot be 
rejected in the case of Greece and the Czech Republic. A closer look at the data shows that 
                                                      
13 This is justified by the fact that interest rate declines will affect only domestic rates and hence influence 
only domestic currency lending. Since after euro area accession an overwhelming part of lending will be done 
in domestic currency, the results obtained for domestic currency loans can be applied to total loans to the 
private sector. Unfortunately, for the EMU-3 countries long series on local currency denominated loans were 
not available. On the other hand, only relatively short series of foreign currency lending in CE-3 countries 
have been available, thus impeding complete comparability of the models. 
26
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 543
November 2005 
in both latter cases the sample is dominated by flat or even falling amount of real loans, 
which explains why no long-run relationship to GDP can be found.  
 
The four encountered cointegrating vectors show a positive relationship between real GDP 
and real loans with elasticities between 1.45 for Ireland and 3.39 in Hungary (Tab. 12-15). 
These numbers (especially those for Poland and Hungary) seem relatively high as 
compared to other studies
14. However, since the financial intermediation in these 
economies is very low, they probably simply reflect the process of financial deepening 
that has been going on over the estimation period and can be expected to hold on over the 
foreseeable future. Real interest rates have in all models a negative impact on real lending, 
whereas the semi-elasticity varies between -4.42 in Hungary and -10.81 in Portugal. 




The major diagnostic tests of the models are satisfactory. At the 5% level we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of normality and lack of autocorrelation in the residuals (Tab. 10, 11). 
Since the time series for the new Member States are already very short we do not perform 
stability tests on them (which require truncating the sample further). The recursive 
estimates of the coefficients (Fig. 6, 8) show substantial parameter stability for Ireland. On 
the other hand, some shifts can be observed in Portugal during the process of euro 
adoption (Fig. 7, 9). Yet, as these are quantitatively modest and the parameter values 
stabilise after euro area accession we have decided to proceed with the Portuguese model 
as well. These estimates, together with the findings in Calza, Manrique and Souza (2003) 
show, that parameters in loan equations changed in a modest way after euro area 
accession. This gives support for our concept of using models estimated for CE-3 
countries to forecast loan developments after euro adoption. 
 
The estimated models are now used to simulate possible loan developments in CE-3 
countries during the process of euro adoption. This means that we solve the models 
forward for the period Q3 2004 – Q4 2020 subject to the following assumptions.  
 
                                                      
14 Calza et al. (2003) report an elasticity of 1.6 for the EMU as a whole, Hofmann (2001) finds elasticities 
between 1.04 and 2.49 for a group of 16 industrial countries.  
15 For instance Calza et al. (2001) find a semi-elasticity of –1.01 for the euro area, on the other hand Calza et 
al. (2003) find -5.05 and Hoffman (2001) reports numbers between -0.01 and -0.08. 
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•  As a general rule we treat only the real interest rate as exogenous. Real lending to 
the private sector and GDP are determined within the model
16.  
•  Euro area accession is scheduled for all countries in 2009. This is in line with the 
objectives of the Hungarian and Polish Governments. The Czech Republic did not 
set any specific target for accession. However, the simulation results can be 
simply “pushed ahead”, if one assumes another date for euro adoption.  
•  The real interest rate remains at its long-run equilibrium level
17 until the end of 
2006, and then starts declining linearly to the euro area level until Q4 2008. This 
is assumed to be 2% at that time, approximately at the long-run equilibrium level 
(Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2003)). Our assumption of equal real rates between 
acceding members and the euro area results from the following reasoning. First, at 
the day of accession nominal interest rates must be equal. Second, the CE-3 
countries will have to fulfil the inflation criterion, they will, however, be 
unwilling to depress inflation unnecessarily. According to simple calculations 
(Borowski and Brzoza-Brzezina (2004)), inflation close to the euro area average 
should be sufficient to fulfil the criterion. Hence, with equal nominal rates and 
similar inflation, real rates will be similar as well. 
•  After euro area accession the real interest rates in the CE-3 countries decline further 
due to increasing inflation in these countries. We assume that this stems only from 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect and, hence, deduct its estimates from the real rate. 
This is assumed to happen linearly during the 4 quarters following accession. The 
estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect are taken from Chmielewski (2003) and 
Kovacs (2002). We assume 1.5% for Hungary and Poland and 1% for the Czech 
Republic. This means that the ultimate real interest rate since Q1 2010 is 0.5% for 
Hungary and Poland and 1% for the Czech Republic. 
•  The simulation process starts from the model’s steady state, i.e. it ignores the initial 
disequilibrium. This implies that the simulation results should not be treated as a 
forecast for the near future but only as an approximation of the developments to 
be expected during euro area accession. 
 
                                                      
16 With Poland being the exception, where the implausibly high long-run growth rate of GDP (6.5% p.a.) is 
corrected exogenously to the sample average of 4.5%. 
17 The consensus estimate for the equilibrium level in Poland, based on Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) and BRE 
(2004) is 4%, in the Czech Republic 2% (CNB 2003). Since for Hungary no estimates are available, we take 
the average over Q3 2003 – Q2 2004, which is 4.5%. 
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The simulations are performed on the basis of the estimated national model (for Hungary 
and Poland) and on the basis of the models estimated for Ireland and Portugal (for all the 
CE-3 countries). As already mentioned, the latter results are performed due to the 
relatively high uncertainty about the quality of the models estimated for the CE-3 
countries with short data samples. They provide an answer to the question “how would the 
Irish (Portuguese) economy behave if it faced a drop in real interest rates that we assume 
for Poland (Czech Republic, Hungary)”.  
 
The results are presented in Appendix 3 (Fig. 10-12). Not surprisingly, the patterns differ 
substantially between the models. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, high growth rates 
of loans to the private sector during the accession period can be seen. However, it should 
be noted that in none of the models the growth rate of loans exceeds 25%. For Poland, the 
peak estimates vary between 12% and 20%, in Hungary between 13% and 21%. Since for 
the Czech Republic we have only the Irish and Portuguese models, not much can be said 
about projected growth rates of loans to the private sector. However, the very decent 
humps that can be observed on Fig. 10 suggest that the loan expansion resulting from euro 
area accession will be very modest in the Czech Republic. This is an obvious consequence 
of the already very low natural rate of interest in this country. Thus, according to the 
simulation results, only Poland and Hungary could expect relatively high growth rates of 
loans to the private sector during euro area accession. Their magnitude can be, however, 
expected to remain below those witnessed in recent years in Ireland and Portugal.  
 
These results are consistent with the main findings from Section 2. Indeed, the potential 
for interest rate decreases and loan increases seems smaller in the CE-3 than in the EMU-3 
countries. Accordingly, it gives support to the thesis that at this point of time not much 
risk of adverse outcomes in the banking sectors during CE-3 countries’ euro area 
accession can be seen. However, given the model uncertainty, the long-time span covered 
and the well-known difficulty in forecasting banking sector crises one should treat these 
results with much caution. Another factor of uncertainty is related to the fact that we 
concentrated only on domestic currency loans.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In the paper we analysed the potential for lending booms and related adverse banking 
sector developments resulting from the process of monetary integration of the three 
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biggest new EU Member States - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. As a first step, 
we described the lending patterns in the three old EMU Member States – Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal. In all the countries substantial increases in lending took place in the years 
shortly before and after euro area accession. In Ireland and Portugal, annual growth rates 
of real loans exceeded 25%, the developments in Greece were slightly more modest. In all 
countries the loan to GDP ratio more than doubled since the mid 1990s. Surprisingly, the 
strong expansions did not affect the stance of these countries’ banking sectors. In fact, as a 
general rule, the quality of the loan portfolio improved, while profitability and solvency 
remained unchanged. Looking for reasons, we found that the relatively harmless character 
of the booms was probably related to the initially low level of financial intermediation in 
these countries. As a result, the lending booms increased the repayment burden to a level 
(relative to income) that has been previously serviced without major problems in more 
advanced EMU countries. 
 
As a second step, we used econometric evidence to foresee the loan developments in CE-3 
countries during euro area accession. On the basis of vector error correction models we 
constructed simulated patterns for loan developments in the new Member States. We 
found that significant increases in lending can be expected in Hungary and Poland. 
However, the magnitude of the booms should be substantially smaller than experienced 
previously by Ireland and Portugal. The main reasons are the high level of interest rate 
convergence between the new Member States and the euro area and the already very low 
level of interest rates in the euro area. Accordingly, there is not much room for downward 
interest rate adjustment during the years of the CE-3 countries’ euro area accession. Due 
to estimation problems the situation in the Czech Republic was more difficult to assess. 
However, given almost complete interest rate convergence between the Czech Republic 
and the euro area, we expect increases in lending related to euro area accession to be even 
smaller than in Hungary and Poland. Analysing the results one should, however, 
remember that we concentrated only on domestic currency loans. Taking into account 
foreign currency loans could change the picture (especially in Hungary and Poland), but it 
is difficult to assess at what side the risks are concentrated. On the one hand exchange rate 
stabilization should support foreign currency lending, on the other, for foreign currencies 
no interest rate convergence (being the main factor driving domestic currency loans), will 




Working Paper Series No. 543
November 2005 
Although it is clearly very difficult to identify ex ante a banking crisis, the experience of 
the analysed euro area countries, combined with the fact that CE-3 countries show an even 
bigger initial underdevelopment of lending activities, have healthy banking sectors and 
can expect smaller increases in lending, leads us to the conclusion that no substantial 
threat for their banking sectors seems to be related to their euro area entry. Nevertheless, it 
should be made clear that the positive experience of the old Member States does not rule 
out the possibility of problems in CE-3 countries. Still, in our view, the recent history of 
loan market developments in EMU-3 countries is probably the best guess about how the 
situation can evolve in the analysed new Member States.  
 
If, however, the situation threatened to go out of control, the supervisory authorities of the 
CE-3 countries could think about using some of the following instruments to curb lending 
or diminish its adverse consequences: 
 
•  Expressing concern in letters to commercial banks, 
•  Moral suasion through domestic informal top management contacts, 
•  Moral suasion by courtesy of foreign supervisory institution (vs. foreign owner), 
•  Tightening of provisioning rules for non performing loans, 
•  Increasing capital adequacy requirements above the regulatory minimum of 8%, 
•  Imposing/decreasing the maximum loan-to-value ratio for housing loans, 
•  Imposing credit ceilings (possibly in implicit ways, e.g. by imposing maximum 
engagement in mortgage loans relative to other lending activities). 
 
It should, however, be borne in mind that measures that worked elsewhere, need not be 
successful in the new Member States. One reason for this is the obvious risk of banks 
taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage. This would mean moving headquarters to 
another EU country where supervisory conditions are less tough, and operating in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland via subsidiaries or the internet. Concluding, if a 
troublesome scenario for the banking sectors in the CE-3 countries were to result from 
euro area accession, monetary authorities could find themselves in a difficult situation. 
Still, at this point of time such developments seem relatively unlikely. 
 
Due to the long time-span of the analysis, the presented results are relatively general and 
should be treated with due caution. Given the uncertainty about the changes in the banking 
sectors (who heard about internet banking ten years ago?) as well as the exact euro area 
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accession date, it would not be very revealing here to go into more detail and analyse the 
specific weaknesses and exposures of banking sectors or major individual banks. 
However, as time goes by and the accession strategies become clearer, such exercises 
should be undertaken. Another interesting and unexplored field are the macroeconomic 
consequences of lending booms in the new Member States. Increased loan creation can 
result in demand and wage pressure, inflation, loss of competitiveness and higher current 
account deficits. All these are interesting topics for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources 
The following sources of data for the econometric model were used: 
 
1.  Loans to the private sector: 
•  Total loans (all currencies) to the private sector (households + non-financial 
corporations + non-profit institutions serving households) in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal – source: ECB  
•  Total loans (domestic currency) to the private sector (households + non-financial 
corporations + non-profit institutions serving households) in the Czech Republic – 
source: Czech National Bank  
•  Total loans (domestic currency) to the private sector (households + non-financial 
corporations + non-profit institutions serving households) in Hungary  – source: 
National Bank of Hungary  
•  Total loans (domestic currency) to the private sector (individuals + non-financial 
corporations) in Poland – source: National Bank of Poland  
 
2.  Nominal interest rate 
•  Czech Republic – source: Czech National Bank (PRIBOR3M) 
•  Greece, Portugal – source: OECD (short-term interest rate) 
•  Hungary – source: ECB (BUIBOR3M) 
•  Ireland – source: BIS (DIBOR3M, EURIBOR3M) 
•  Poland - source: National Bank of Poland (WIBOR3M) 
 
3.  GDP at constant prices 
•  All countries – source: OECD  
 
4.  GDP deflator  
•  Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal – source: OECD  
•  Poland – 1997-2004 GDP deflator (source: OECD); 1994-1996 GDP deflator 
substituted by domestic CPI (source: Central Statistical Office) due to 
questionable quality of deflator data; 
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Appendix 2: Estimation results 
Table 7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with constant for presence of unit roots 
  Greece Ireland Portugal Czech Republic Hungary Poland
l 0.29  1.13 1.22 -0.61 1.78  -2.46
∆l  -2.07 -2.73* -3.19** -5.20*** -5.10***  -3.26***
y 1.79  0.11 -1.00 0.76 -0.13  -1.25
∆y  -13.45*** -2.37 -2.63* -2.79* -4.39***  -7.73***
r  -1.85 -2.20 -1.91 -0.19 -2.45 -2.20
∆r  -8.43*** -8.31*** -9.27*** -3.30** -6.22*** -5.02***
*, **, *** denote rejection of H0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Number of lags was chosen in accordance with 
the Schwarz info criterion. Critical values from McKinnon (1996). 
 
  Lag LR  AIC SC HQ
GR 0  NA    -7.22 -7.13 -7.19 
 1  684.37 -16.00 -15.64 -15.86 
 2  31.04 -16.20 -15.58 -15.95 
 3  11.15 -16.14 -15.24 -15.78 
 4  22.97 -16.26 -15.09 -15.79 
 5  17.70 -16.30 -14.88 -15.73 
 6 5.10 -16.17 -14.47 -15.48 
IRL 0  NA    -5.99 -5.72 -5.88 
 1  763.07 -16.07 -15.54 -15.86 
 2  56.04 -16.64- 1 5.33 -16.31 
 3  15.18 -16.63 -15.56 -16.21 
 4 9.38 -16.55 -15.21 -16.02 
 5  14.18 -16.56 -14.95 -15.91 
 6  17.36 -16.64 -14.76 -15.88 
PT 0  NA    -4.96 -4.87 -4.92 
 1  1054.39 -17.30 -16.97 -17.17 
 2  64.73 -17.90 -17.31 -17.66 
 3  28.22 -18.06 -17.21 -17.72 
 4  21.45 -18.14 -17.04 -17.69 
 5  29.11 -18.34 -16.99 -17.79 
 6 3.92 -18.19 -16.59 -17.54 
CZ 0  NA   -9.76 -9.63 -9.71 
 1  213.62 -16.35 -15.81 -16.17 
 2  26.91 -16.82 -15.88 -16.50 
 3 9.73 -16.69 -15.35 -16.24 
 4  13.60 -16.81 -15.06 -16.22 
HU 0  NA    -9.26 -9.12 -9.21 
 1  240.07 -17.57 -17.01- 1 7.35 
 2  15.86 -17.65 -16.68 -17.33 
 3  15.28 -17.80 -16.41 -17.34 
 4  12.32 -17.90 -16.10 -17.31 
PL 0  NA    -8.76 -8.63 -8.72 
 1  268.05 -16.17 -15.66 -15.99 
 2  28.92 -16.63 -15.73 -16.31 
 3  15.92 -16.73 -15.43 -16.27 
 4 9.32 -16.63 -14.95 -16.03 
LR denotes sequential modified LR test statistic, AIC denotes Akaike information criterion,  SC denotes Schwarz 
information criterion, HQ denotes Hannan-Quinn information criterion. Numbers in bold indicate lag order selected by the 
criterion for the VAR model. 
 
Table 9: Cointegration tests  












Greece 0 20.56  29.80 0 12.99 21.13 
 <=1 7.57  15.49 <=1 6.75 14.26 
 <=2 0.82  3.84 <=2 0.82 3.84 
Ireland  0  34.04 29.80 0 24.17 21.13 
 <=1 9.87  15.49 <=1 9.13 14.26 
 <=2 0.74  3.84 <=2 0.74 3.84 
Portugal  0 31.75  29.80 0 25.23 21.13 
 <=1 6.52  15.49 <=1 5.48 14.26 
 <=2 1.04  3.84 <=2 1.04 3.84 
Czech Rep. 0 20.46  29.80 0 12.82 21.13 
 <=1 7.64  15.49 <=1 7.60 14.26 
 <=2 0.04  3.84 <=2 0.04 3.84 
Hungary  0 37.23  29.80 0 27.71 21.13 
 <=1 9.51  15.49 <=1 6.24 14.26 
 <=2 3.27  3.84 <=2 3.27 3.84 
Poland  0 32.12  29.80 0 18.55 21.13 
 <=1 13.57  15.49 <=1 11.95 14.26 
 <=2 1.63  3.84 <=2 1.63 3.84 
Numbers in bold denote rejection of H0 at the 5% level. Critical values are from MacKinnon, Haug, Michelis (1999). 
 
Table 8: Lag selection criteria 
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 Chi  square 
statistic 
Probability   Chi  square 
statistic 
Probability 
IRL  Skewness 0.72 0.86 HU  Skewness 3.77 0.28
  Kurtosis 1.55 0.66 Kurtosis 2.47 0.48
  Jarque-Berra 2.28 0.89 Jarque-Berra 6.25 0.39
PT Skewness  3.46 0.32 PL Skewness  1.62 0.65
  Kurtosis 5.70 0.12 Kurtosis 2.31 0.51
  Jarque-Berra 9.17 0.16 Jarque-Berra 3.93 0.68
Ho: residuals are multivariate normal. 
 
Country Lag  LM  statistic Probability Country Lag  LM  statistic Probability
Ireland 1  14.41 0.11 Hungary 1 8.30 0.50
 2  10.45 0.32 2  12.85 0.17
 3  14.47 0.11 3  9.65 0.38
 4  15.89 0.07 4  8.54 0.48
Portugal 1  5.93 0.75 Poland 1  10.62 0.30
 2  6.02 0.74 2  11.37 0.25
 3  8.76 0.46 3  10.57 0.31
  4 6.92 0.65 4 2.94 0.97
H0: no autocorrelation present at lag n. 
 
Table 12: VEC model for Hungary 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1  
  
RKRED(-1)   1.000000   
  
GDP FIXED SA(-1) -3.391334   
   (0.24341)  
  [-13.9328]  
  
RINT(-1)   4.429280   
   (1.05327)  
  [ 4.20526]  
  
C   42.87768  
  
Error Correction:  D(RKRED) D(GDP FIXED SA) D(RINT)
  
  
CointEq1 -0.113619    0.011550 -0.026918
   (0.03230)   (0.00736) (0.02985)
  [-3.51808]  [ 1.56914] [-0.90192]
  
D(RKRED(-1)) -0.080560    0.128065 0.053080
   (0.17116)   (0.03901) (0.15818)
  [-0.47066]  [ 3.28273] [ 0.33558]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- -0.150221   0.100513 -0.031833
   (0.69216)   (0.15776) (0.63965)
  [-0.21703]  [ 0.63713] [-0.04977]
  
D(RINT(-1))   0.282671  -0.086372 -0.036286
   (0.24561)   (0.05598) (0.22697)
  [ 1.15090]  [-1.54292] [-0.15987]
  
C   0.027935   0.005662 -0.000505
   (0.00812)   (0.00185) (0.00750)
  [ 3.44064]  [ 3.05946] [-0.06731]
  
 R-squared   0.364282   0.313121 0.068578
 Adj. R-squared   0.273465   0.214995 -0.064482
 Sum sq. resids   0.014020   0.000728 0.011973
 S.E. equation   0.022376   0.005100 0.020678  
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1  
  
RKRED(-1) 1.000000  
  




RINT(-1) 6.266904  
(1.20762)  
[ 5.18946]  
  
C 18.47941  
  
Error Correction: D(RKRED) D(GDP FIXED SA) D(RINT)
  
CointEq1 -0.025615 -0.022766 -0.042131
(0.01218)   (0.00874) (0.01050)
[-2.10273]  [-2.60585] [-4.01383]
  
D(RKRED(-1)) 0.433655   0.259496 -0.201119
(0.08296)   (0.05950) (0.07148)
[ 5.22746]  [ 4.36154] [-2.81360]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- 0.649162 -0.192944 0.121974
(0.14231)   (0.10206) (0.12262)
[ 4.56160]  [-1.89042] [ 0.99470]
  
D(RINT(-1)) 0.001629   0.131443 0.239240
(0.11127)   (0.07981) (0.09588)
[ 0.01464]  [ 1.64705] [ 2.49517]
  
C 0.005375   0.010293 0.002682
(0.00317)   (0.00227) (0.00273)
[ 1.69480]  [ 4.52563] [ 0.98150]
  
DUM Q2 93 -0.004204   0.007898 -0.058824
(0.01780)   (0.01277) (0.01534)
[-0.23613]  [ 0.61856] [-3.83479]
  
DUM Q4 92 0.002283 -0.002801 0.061499
(0.01697)   (0.01217) (0.01463)
[ 0.13451]  [-0.23007] [ 4.20480]
  
R-squared 0.537672   0.304835 0.461284
Adj. R-squared 0.501647   0.250666 0.419306
Sum sq. resids 0.021644   0.011133 0.016070
S.E. equation 0.016766   0.012024 0.014446  
 
Table 10: Tests for normality of residuals 
Table 11: LM test for presence of residual autocorrelation  
Table 13: VEC model for Ireland 
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Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1  
    
RKRED(-1)   1.000000   
    
GDP FIXED SA(-1) -3.169606   
   (0.91354)  
  [-3.46960]  
    
RINT(-1)   7.569300   
   (2.38630)  
  [ 3.17198]  
    
C   26.19142  
    
Error Correction:  D(RKRED) D(GDP FIXED SA) D(RINT)
    
    
CointEq1 -0.034423  -0.020601 -0.018821
   (0.01112)   (0.00665) (0.00728)
  [-3.09660]  [-3.09681] [-2.58484]
    
D(RKRED(-1))   0.558097  -0.006939 0.199533
   (0.13933)   (0.08338) (0.09126)
  [ 4.00566]  [-0.08322] [ 2.18643]
    
D(GDP FIXED SA(- -0.564859 -0.640016 -0.576013
   (0.26949)   (0.16127) (0.17652)
  [-2.09603]  [-3.96853] [-3.26322]
    
D(RINT(-1))   0.272015   0.586848 0.321283
   (0.28257)   (0.16910) (0.18508)
  [ 0.96264]  [ 3.47039] [ 1.73587]
    
C   0.016826   0.017073 0.003195
   (0.00528)   (0.00316) (0.00346)
  [ 3.18633]  [ 5.40260] [ 0.92381]
    
 R-squared   0.515223   0.411410 0.398339
 Adj. R-squared   0.456462   0.340066 0.325411
 Sum sq. resids   0.013237   0.004741 0.005679
 S.E. equation   0.020028   0.011986 0.013118  
Table 15: VEC model for Portugal 
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1  
  
RKRED(-1) 1.000000  
  




RINT(-1) 10.81069  
(1.06162)  
[ 10.1832]  
  
C 36.41126  
  
Error Correction: D(RKRED) D(GDP FIXED SA) D(RINT)
  
CointEq1 -0.041439 -0.007780 -0.047317
(0.01436)   (0.00511) (0.01075)
[-2.88512]  [-1.52108] [-4.40326]
  
D(RKRED(-1)) 0.418074 -0.029735 0.050574
(0.10932)   (0.03893) (0.08179)
[ 3.82447]  [-0.76385] [ 0.61837]
  
D(RKRED(-2)) 0.117589 -0.034141 0.053350
(0.11564)   (0.04118) (0.08652)
[ 1.01686]  [-0.82907] [ 0.61664]
  
D(RKRED(-3)) 0.042997   0.044715 0.120457
(0.11657)   (0.04151) (0.08722)
[ 0.36884]  [ 1.07712] [ 1.38114]
  
D(RKRED(-4)) 0.279743 -0.001128 -0.275741
(0.10761)   (0.03832) (0.08051)
[ 2.59969]  [-0.02943] [-3.42509]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- -0.157865   0.311065 0.163283
(0.32447)   (0.11555) (0.24275)
[-0.48654]  [ 2.69212] [ 0.67263]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- 0.366404   0.449150 -0.259900
(0.33389)   (0.11890) (0.24980)
[ 1.09738]  [ 3.77748] [-1.04042]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- 0.378838   0.080749 0.018446
(0.34215)   (0.12184) (0.25598)
[ 1.10723]  [ 0.66273] [ 0.07206]
  
D(GDP FIXED SA(- -0.632562 -0.137648 -0.588911
(0.32770)   (0.11670) (0.24517)
[-1.93031]  [-1.17953] [-2.40205]
  
D(RINT(-1)) 0.199419   0.053828 0.188078
(0.13374)   (0.04763) (0.10006)
[ 1.49110]  [ 1.13022] [ 1.87969]
  
D(RINT(-2)) 0.153020   0.064525 0.289266
(0.13334)   (0.04748) (0.09976)
[ 1.14763]  [ 1.35891] [ 2.89973]
  
D(RINT(-3)) -0.086889   0.061844 0.177704
(0.13232)   (0.04712) (0.09900)
[-0.65666]  [ 1.31246] [ 1.79507]
  
D(RINT(-4)) -0.059665   0.028056 -0.104134
(0.12100)   (0.04309) (0.09053)
[-0.49308]  [ 0.65109] [-1.15027]
  
C 0.002422   0.002129 0.005425
(0.00292)   (0.00104) (0.00218)
[ 0.83065]  [ 2.05021] [ 2.48647]
  
R-squared 0.636319   0.533177 0.529121
Adj. R-squared 0.573281   0.452261 0.447503
Sum sq. resids 0.020334   0.002579 0.011381




Table 14: VEC model for Poland 
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Appendix 3: Figures 
Figure 6: Recursive estimates of the GDP 
parameter (β1) in the Irish model (initialisation 





















  Figure 7: Recursive estimates of the GDP 
parameter (β1) in the Portuguese model 





























Figure 8: Recursive estimates of interest rate 
parameter (β2) in the Irish model (initialisation 























Figure 9: Recursive estimates of interest rate 
parameter (β2) in the Portuguese model 
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